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Abstract
Nowadays, in the era of accelerated globalization, we are challenged to re-
examine some basic postulates of democracy. The notions of individualism, 
human rights, freedoms and equality of chances must undergo serious 
changes because democracy is threatened from at least three sides. First, 
the global trend of empowerment of the far right makes us think about the 
efficiency of democracy’s defense mechanisms. Second, the dystopia of the 
world as a global village, when combined with the hyperreality of mass 
media, has transformed democracy into Beck’s risk society. And third, 
democracy is threatened by its inner paradoxes. Furthermore, our aim 
will be to show theoretically that democracy can only exist as a promise 
to come. Its fatal attraction lies in this deceptive nature. In the mist of 
mainstream interpretations, our opinion is that only a radical critique of 
democracy can help us deal with its self-destructive nature.
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Philosophical Prelude to the Notions of Democracy and the 
Turning Point
Will you allow as a certainty that we are at a turning point? If it is a certainty 
it is not a turning point. The fact of our belonging to this moment at which 
a change of epoch, if there is one, is being accomplished also takes hold of the 
certain knowledge that would want to determine it, making both certainty and 
uncertainty inappropriate. Never are we less able to get around ourselves than at 
such a moment and the discrete force of the turning point lies first in this.
(Blanchot, 1993:264)
Whether we assume that we are at a turning point or not, it would 
be simplistic to start by neglecting the discrete force of the turning 
point itself. Indeed, for this very reason, it would be useful to begin 
by deferring the beginning and asking the first question, a question 
to be asked before any other, which anyway comes before, be it by 
surprise or expectedly by surprise: what is democracy and at what is 
its turning point?
This problem can clearly be expressed even in positive terms: it is the 
haunting possibility that our democracy and our turning point do 
not coincide with each other, and that renders democracy a fearless 
and not a privatisable turning point. For instance, to state that 
democracy is at a turning point can easily amount to the rogueisation 
(Derrida, 2005: 78–79)* of its alternatives, which are nothing 
more than the effects of democracy itself. In such circumstances, 
“democracy at a turning point” amounts to playing by the rules, 
by the rails**, moving in a straight line without bending neither the 
rules nor the rails. But, without this possibility of transgression, a 
rule, a rail, a turning point itself would actually be for nothing. It 
is the singular plurality of the turning point which always-already 
undermines its unity: without the possibility of turning from the 
turning point, no turning point would really be a turning point.
*  Derrida notes that “[…] in the French idiom, someone can do something that is 
‘voyou’ [rogue] without being a rogue. As such, it announces, prepares, and begins to justify 
some sanction”. 
**  Words “rule” and “rail” have the same etymology: regula (lat.) meaning “straight 
stick, bar, ruler”. See for instance https://www.etymonline.com/word/rule and https://
www.etymonline.com/word/rail.
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Paradoxically then, rather than accepting and embracing the plastic 
Otherness through playing by the rules, it is actually affirming 
democracy as a turning point that we necessarily and inevitably do 
both a great deal and very little. The epoch of the sole benefaction 
being epistemologically behind us and structurally always-
already there, it is long overdue that we recognize that by negating 
democracy one actually upholds it, and that by affirming it, the final 
product of democracy results immediately deferred. Democracy as 
a turning point is, before all, a deictic phenomenon.
In order to stay strictly on the argument: we do not need to challenge 
democracy because it is always-already challenged by its very 
existence. Many issues are evident, especially nowadays – in times 
of accelerated globalization. In this work we will tackle three of 
them: first, the global empowerment of the far right which forces us 
to re-examine the notion of democratic defense mechanisms in the 
fight with disloyal competitors; second, the ambiguous influence of 
mass media whose enlightenment role has become a cruel method 
of surveillance and punishment. Third, the inner paradoxes of 
democracy, backed by the experience of different thinkers, such 
as Kant with his notion that obeying the rules is crucial and above 
any kind of freedom. Rancière’s critique of democracy is also quite 
fruitful, especially when he says that democracy is the rule of no 
one because demos does not have an arkhê* to govern. We will try 
to propose some solutions to these difficult challenges. We will 
talk about the expansion of the signified field of democracy, about 
democracy-to-come and, finally, about our own private crucial ex-
centrism.
Populism – The Ambiguous Threat to Democracy
Nowadays, we can read a number of news about growing right-
wing populism in Europe which is, in most cases, written in the 
manner of premonition or in fear of resident evil. After the recent 
political developments, fear has become a clear and present danger. 
The specter of populism is spreading around Europe. In their article 
How Far is Europe Swinging to the Right the New York Times reports 
with no lack of critical sharpness: “Amid a migrant crisis, economic 
inequality, growing disillusionment with the European Union and
*  Arkhê is both the first cause, the beginning, the origin (arkhê) and the entitlement to 
govern (arkhêin). Accordingly, to be bereft of the arkhê stands for the lack of the origin of the 
entitlement to govern as a proof for its legitimate exercise.
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a sense of lost national identity, right-wing parties in a growing 
number of European countries have made electoral gains” 
(NYTimes, 2016). It is obvious that right-wing populism could not 
rise in a political climate which is suitable to everyone. Rightists are 
constantly emphasizing, rightfully to some extent, that the burden 
of guilt is in the garden of their ideological adversaries. Costas 
Douzinas said: “Left is either incapable of winning power, or has no 
idea what to do with it” (Douzinas, 2013: 210). We must add that it is 
not just a matter of power. Namely, the Left is deprived of ideology 
and the Right knows how to (ab)use that fact. That is why we can 
claim that democracy does not have effective defensive mechanisms 
against practices which are found to be non-democratic, which 
are in turn characteristics of right-wing populism. The issue is in 
the incapability of democracy to survive its full realization. Since 
populism is a threat to democracy, it can have dire consequences 
or can, at least, potentially put democracy in serious danger. In 
order to detect the democratic deficit, we must briefly examine the 
discourse on populism.
Greven says: “Populism’s central and permanent narrative 
is the juxtaposition of a (corrupt) »political class,« »elite,« or 
»establishment,« and »the people,« as whose sole authentic voice 
the populist party bills itself” (Greven, 2016: 1). But in the very 
moment we identify the essence of populism in judging the corrupt 
political class, we become populists ourselves. Even if this claim is 
true, we cannot constitute the meaning of populism basing it solely 
on negative premises. It is precisely the opposite, the Left today is 
being built on the denial of right-wing populism. To be blatantly 
simple, we can compare two statements. The first one is from Victor 
Orban and is a prime example of a right-wing politician: “Hungary 
does not need a single migrant for the economy to work, or the 
population to sustain itself, or for the country to have a future” 
(TheGuardian, 2016). Certainly, it is a controversial statement but 
written in the self-confident manner of the Right which has a clear 
idea for the future. On the other hand, there is Emanuel Macron, 
a centrist politician: “Nationalism is war. I know it. I come from 
a region that is full of graveyards” (Reuters, 2017). So, the centrist 
position is that a future with the Right is not viable. And that is the 
crucial issue – it shows us all the impotence of democracy to defend 
itself.
In our opinion, in the choice of Macron and Le Pen, the voters of 
Le Pen are not the problematic ones. Those who voted for Macron 
simply in order not to vote for Le Pen are much more troublesome.
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They did not vote for, but against. The main idea of these paragraphs 
is to show that they did not have anything to vote for in Macron’s 
political campaign.* The right-wing policy included discriminating, 
disturbing, violent and racist ideas, but at least they were precise. 
The Left and the Center offered nothing else than the bare negation 
of the Right. That is why we can say that nowadays the (radical) 
Left and the (radical) Right are similar to some extent. Right-wing 
populism is the only political and ideological orientation that gives 
pragmatic solutions for social phenomena. It is important to note 
that subversion has been pertinent to the left side of the ideological 
scale. But, populism is the agent which has made the two overlap.
Martin Schultz said: “To combat right-wing extremism in Europe 
we need to be conscious of specific basic values – values that have 
to be regarded as inviolable across the spectrum from right to left! 
If these basic values are challenged, they have to be communally 
defended” (Schultz, 2011: 27). This approach is completely wrong. 
Namely, we should not fight against populism, but for democratic 
values and for a society based on those values. We cannot reduce the 
democratic deficit by fighting against a common enemy, since it will 
always result in the deficit being exactly the same. The only right 
way is to redefine the notion of democracy and to make it function 
in modern societies. In other words, to give it a breath of fresh 
ideas. When it comes to treating populism, we must quote Slavoj 
Žižek: “For the enlightened liberal-technocratic elite, populism is 
inherently “proto-Fascist,” the demise of political reason, a revolt in 
the guise of the outburst of blind utopian passions. The easiest reply 
to this distrust would have been to claim that populism is inherently 
neutral: a kind of transcendental-formal political dispositive that 
can be incorporated into different political engagements” (Lacan.
com, 2006). What Žižek suggests is to treat populism as any other 
idea that can be defeated by being put into practice. Basically, 
confronting populism with the possibility of being the only option 
would be the final defeat for it. We know it from the Freudian 
theory of dreams: if you want to destroy a dream, just make it 
real. However, the problem is that the defensive mechanisms of 
democracy will not function because there is no more populism. 
There will always be another threat, maybe even more appealing 
and dangerous. To make the mechanism function means to reshape 
the common sense of what democracy should mean.
*  Macron is just an example of a paradigmatic figure; it is not the intention of the 
authors to go deeper into considerations about him.
116
Is Mass Media a Guest or a Parasite of Democracy?
Similar to the notion of populism, the relation between mass media 
and democracy can be read in two ways. Namely, it is very hard 
to find a better platform for the exchange of opinions, wide social 
inclusion and accessibility of information for the population. Among 
numerous functions of mass media, we can find the following 
ones: to inform, to be a watchdog, to serve the political system, to 
set an agenda, to entertain, to be a place for voices to be heard, to 
hold society together (Bittner, 1996: 11). All of these functions are 
indirectly under the legal norm of what is necessary in a democratic 
society. However, if used deliberately in the wrong manner, mass 
media can become by far the biggest threat for democratic system. 
By becoming a judge instead of a mediator, it can create and 
destroy lives. It can create events that did not happen at all and it is 
embodied in Boorstin’s term “pseudo-event”. It is a kind of media 
creating events which include alternating reality or a planting of 
a completely new one. As Boorstin says: “The modern American 
tourist now fills his experience with pseudo-events. He has come 
to believe that he can have a lifetime of adventure in two weeks 
and all the thrills of risking his life without any real risk at all” 
(Boorstin, 1961: 93). The “increase” in reality and the transformation 
to realities was noticed by Jean Baudrillard when he created the 
term “hyperreality”. So, we are not living our everyday reality 
anymore, but the media created one which is more real than reality 
itself. In his words: “Reality is jealous of picture” (Baudrillard, 2002: 
28). Only the hyperreal era could bring the “ingenious” saying that, 
if it was not in the news, it did not happen. For the sake of power 
or economic interest, the mass media can overshadow the whole 
democratic system and even democracy as an idea(l). We will show 
this on the paradigmatic example of terrorism.
The reasons why the mass media has been a fertile ground for 
terrorism and the other way around are pretty simple. The mass 
media is ubiquitous and easy-to-reach while terrorists need to spread 
their message to as many recipients as possible. Therein lies a very 
old dilemma – if the mass media just gives visibility to terrorists, 
or if it actively participates in their revealing and extermination. 
Without going into that discussion, we can quote Baudrillard again 
with: “The spectacle of terrorism forces the terrorism of spectacle 
upon us” (Baudrillard, 2002:30). The mega-capitalistic demands of 
the mass media for a bigger profit and a bigger audience dictate 
the agenda of what is attractive. Human suffering has always been 
appreciated and since death is the king of all suffering, terrorists 
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succeeded in transforming their deaths into a weapon against a 
system that operates on basis of the exclusion of death. Terrorists 
accept to kill themselves in sacrifice for some unclear ideals: 
“Terrorism has no meaning, no objective, and cannot be measured 
by its real political and historical consequences” (Baudrillard, 2002: 
57). Certainly, it means that the mass media distorted the appearance 
of terrorism and accommodated it to its own needs. This can be 
best seen in how mass media presented the September 11 attacks. It 
was interesting that we did not have a chance to see any blood, any 
death or even any frightening scene in any of the reports from the 
biggest media networks. On the other hand, we remember all the 
reports of Islamic State or Boko Haram where absence of blood is a 
pertinent miracle: we look at live decapitations and ritual killings. 
Žižek says: “The real horror happens there, not here” (Žižek, 2002: 
13). The guilty ones are always the others, not us. This one-sided 
approach may be considered as good in societies where it is needed 
to “make real violence to get to surface, as an opposition to the 
invisible violence of security” (Baudrillard, 1994: 40).
We can conclude that the media-constructed reality poses a great 
threat for democracy, which once again does not have an appropriate 
answer. The only cure for this is to prevent confusion between 
reality and the virtual world and to show critical sharpness when it 
comes to considering whether media content should be accepted as 
true. One golden rule should always be kept in mind: let the media 
serve you, do not ever serve the media. The intimate space in the 
broader setting of the world must be preserved. We base this claim 
on the micro-contribution that democracy can defend itself against 
the intrusion. The next chapter will in a roundabout manner look 
into the problematic question of whether democracy wants to be 
saved at all.
Democracy: a Notion, a Concept or at least both?
Nowadays, democracy is too often seen as a form of consensus: 
to decide democratically translates into reaching a consensus on 
a question. This assumption has been contested by postmodernist 
thinkers. For instance, Jacques Rancière inverts this logic by 
showing methodologically that there is not just one logic, just one 
logos (Rancière, 2010: 45–62). He gives a straightforward account of 
democracy’s internal self-destructiveness. That is what he, clearly 
enough, calls the “democratic paradox” (Rancière, 2010: 45). Very 
simply: “[...] democracy as a form of government is threatened by 
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democracy as a form of social and political life and so the former 
must repress the latter” (Rancière, 2010: 47). How is it possible 
that, when talking about democracy, we actually have at least two 
democracies, as underlined by the French philosopher? How come 
that we have democracy and democracies at the same time – what 
determines the disclosure of the sense(s) of this word? Rancière seems 
to have the answer once again: “Democracy is the specific situation 
in which it is the absence of entitlement that entitles one to exercise 
the arkhê. It is the commencement without commencement, a form 
of rule (commandement) that does not command [...] Democracy 
is not a political regime. It is the very regime of politics itself as a 
form of relationship that defines a specific subject [...] democracy is 
not a political regime in the sense that it forms one of the possible 
constitutions which define the ways in which people assemble 
under a common authority” (Rancière, 2010: 31).
So, what is the first element of such a statement? I would say “the 
absence of entitlement which entitles”, which traduces into what 
Agamben calls “the state of exception”. There is a state of exception, 
the absence of entitlement, which is not, however, an exceptional 
state of exception. Nor a temporary exceptional state of exception. 
On the contrary, for the absence of entitlement to entitle, we need it 
as a permanent state of exception, as a permanent confusing turning 
point, as a permanent temporary exceptional state of exception. 
Democracy thus becomes the form of government of those who 
have no form of government, an exceptional state for those in the 
state of exception and an entitlement for those with no entitlement. 
Only as such can democracy withstand its governmental and 
liberal version. Were there no democracy in the form of democracies, 
these lines would have no sense because their sense(s) would be 
fully accomplished. Their Sinn and Bedeutung, their sense(s) and 
reference(s), would be superposed. It would amount to putting 
democratic institutions literally in the book: an utterly violent and 
unnecessary scenario of supplementing what is and detains a self-
sufficient meaningfulness.
The second important element in Rancière’s statement is 
“commencement without commencement”, that is the first cause 
without the first cause. The first cause which is at the same time its own 
opposite, as well as its own negator; a union of Kant’s affirmative, 
negative and infinite judgment. And when it comes to the third 
point by Rancière, namely “[democracy] as a form of relationship 
that defines a specific subject” (Rancière, 2010: 31), it highlights 
all the vainness of exporting democracy, which then equals to 
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nothing more than mango or arms export, to just another political 
calculus. And who better to describe it than one of the fathers of 
present-day Enlightenment: “It is not from the benevolence of the 
butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but 
from their regard to their own interest” (Smith, 2007: 16). So, it is not 
us who have democracy at our disposal, but exactly the other way 
around. Any dissent just confirms this, and any agreement becomes 
a disapproval. Reinterpretation is all about that: “Repetition thus 
appears as a difference, but a difference absolutely without concept; 
in this sense, an indifferent difference” (Deleuze, 1994: 15).
If democracy is not a political regime, if it is the entitlement of those 
with no arkhê, then democracy belongs to the people (demos) who 
“exists only as a rupture with the logic of arkhê, a rupture with 
the logic of commencement/commandement” (Rancière, 2010: 
33). “People” is here used just as a translation of the Greek word 
demos, but this does not mean that it is necessarily plural. It can 
perfectly be singular even if it, as we saw, does not mean that this 
singularity possesses democracy. This matter, however, seems to 
be the point where Rancière disagrees with Derrida who writes 
about a Messianic dimension of democracy-to-come (Derrida, 
2005:88). Still, if “people” is not necessarily plural, then “Messiah” 
is not necessarily singular. The former is a matter of the translation 
from the Greek language, while the latter is just a metaphor, 
which, in spite of and on account of its im-possibility (of its to-
comeness), denotes exactly the undenotable, that which rejects every 
denotation which is not the denotation of its undenotability. This 
is why democracy is autoimmune: it entitles the unentitled to be 
such, because it is threatened by its very logic which at the same 
time protects it and destructs it, which is at the same time in and 
out, metaphysical and non-metaphysical. Just as différance, which, 
in spite of its transcendence of metaphysics, remains a metaphysical 
name as well as all the names it receives in our language which are, 
as names, metaphysical (Derrida, 1997: 56).
For Derrida, thus, there is a “Messianicity without Messianism” 
(Derrida, 2005: 88) and it is not a coincidence that he uses two 
different words here. On the one hand, “Messianicity” makes us 
think about something which is under (de)construction, which is 
in progress, which does not end. In a nutshell, it is the chiliastic 
dimension of what is never and remains always to-come as the 
structural possibility of what actually is: the reason why it is not just 
another –ism lies precisely in the fact that it supervenes and surprises 
by nature and is thus not projectable in the form of an ideology. On 
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the other hand, “Messianism” is exactly the ideologocentric form 
of Messianicity, the programmable and expectable arrival of the 
Attended Messia in person. In Messianicity, every waiting is in vain 
and every arrival im-possible. Messianism, instead, is what Rancière 
means by Police: “Two ways of counting the parts of the community 
exist. The first counts real parts only – actual groups defined by 
differences in birth and by different functions, places and interests 
that make up the social body to the exclusion of every supplement. 
The second ‘in addition’ to this counts a part of those without part. I 
call the first police and the second politics” (Rancière, 2010:36). Police 
is thus that which legalizes without taking into account justice as a 
‘supplement’; police is politics without democracy, politics without 
politicizing, Rortian construction without deconstruction. But the 
latter is just another construction, contrary to what is often said and 
written about it: imagining deconstruction as De(con)struction is 
just another Kantian enlightened mechanism of construction and 
consensus. “The essence of politics, [on the contrary], is dissensus” 
(Rancière, 2010: 38), as a supplement which protects politics from 
being reduced to The Police.
This is why “[p]olitics will always fail to deliver on promises to 
implement freedom and equality integrally” (Rancière, 2010: 80). 
This is why Derrida challenges Law with justice and democracy 
with democracy-to-come. The Law of Justice is democracy-to-come.
Demo(n)cracies: a Multidisciplinary Account
In his book “How the World Works” (2011), Noam Chomsky opens 
a chapter entitled War is peace. Freedom is slavery. Ignorance is strength 
in the following way: “According to the common-sense meaning, 
a society is democratic to the extent that people can participate 
in a meaningful way in managing their affairs. But the doctrinal 
meaning of democracy is different – it refers to a system in which 
decisions are made by sectors of the business community and 
related elites” (Chomsky, 2011:64). What we can define problematic 
here, after our long mental excursus, is that “people” is a rather 
ambiguous and equivocal term, if “term” is the proper word 
at all. Similarly, Chomsky takes for granted that a meaningful 
participation means something per se; rather, it is precisely the 
semantic rupture within the homogenized concept of “people” that 
defines the meaningfulness itself. Accordingly, it would be quite 
difficult to envisage in “people” an accomplished sense subverted 
from an outside, the latter being actually nothing more than what 
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engenders the inside itself.
Yet, Chomsky does not stop here: “If segments of the public depart 
from their apathy and begin to organize and enter the public 
arena, that’s not democracy [...] it’s a crisis of democracy” (Chomsky, 
2011:64). We can now see that he does not miss the opportunity to 
problematize the very nature of people, of “the public”, in this case 
Chomsky seems to be saying that democracy actually both attacks 
itself and defends itself from itself.
Naomi Klein comes close to this reasoning when she says the 
following: “As Latin Americans had just learned, authoritarian 
regimes have a habit of embracing democracy at the precise moment 
when their economic projects are about to implode” (Klein, 2008: 
175). We would like to highlight an interesting word choice here: 
it explains by itself why Chomsky’s and Klein’s positions might be 
considered strictly connected.
The word we should draw our attention to is “(to) implode”: why 
not to explode? Why has Klein chosen the inverted explosion, the 
explosion towards inside in mentioning democracy? To implode, 
that is to collapse inward, to (be) self-destruct(ed). We claim that 
only a “wider” democracy can withstand suicidal economic projects 
and survive its own implosion. Where you cut a head, a couple of 
new ones grow in its place.
But Klein does not end here, either: an ambiguous chapter title 
speaks about Surviving Democracy: Bombs Made of Laws. Things 
get far more complicated: Klein clearly states that the survival of 
democracy has to be survived, which cannot but make us think 
about the aforementioned concepts of evil democracy and the state 
of exception. And we claim that this is the very framework with no 
frames which enables her to say that “[t]his book is a challenge to 
the central and most cherished claim in the official story – that the 
triumph of deregulated capitalism has been born out of freedom, 
that unfettered free markets go in hand with democracy” (Klein, 
2008: 18). The only Invisible Hand that the Canadian journalist sees 
is that of disruptive meanings.
Such is the situation in which “September 11 appeared to have 
provided Washington with the green light to stop asking countries 
if they wanted the U.S. version of “free trade and democracy” and 
to start imposing it with Shock and Awe military force” (Klein, 
2008: 18). And such is the situation in which Tariq Ali, in Letter to a 
Young Muslim declares as follows: “[...] democracy means the right 
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to think differently, and [...] [f]or the West, [it] means believing 
exactly the same things that they believe. Is that really democracy?” 
(Ali, 2003:306). We see that Ali first introduces an apparently 
irreconcilable dichotomy, but then asks a question without asking 
for an answer, by asking an affirmative question (actually an always-
already non-affirmative one). Ali proves ipso facto that democracy is 
precisely that because it is not. For, what would the right to be if you 
did not have to ask for it, if it could not be abolished?
Susan George shows no less anxiousness about what she calls 
“illegitimate authority” (Abc.net.au, 2013), namely that of 
multinational corporations and supranational entities where 
Leviathan seems to be unleashed, as a clear rupture in the democratic 
authorization can be identified.
Finally, Slavoj Žižek sums up perfectly not only that which is 
imposed by the power structures of a society, but also that which 
is more imposed, preferably imposed in the general framework 
of mere imposition: “In a classic line from a Hollywood screwball 
comedy, the girl asks her boyfriend: ‘Do you want to marry me?‘ 
’No!’ ’Stop dodging the issue! Give me a straight answer!’’ In a way, 
the underlying logic is correct: the only acceptable straight answer 
for the girl is ’Yes!’, so anything else, including a straight ‘No!’, 
counts as evasion. This underlying logic, of course, is again that of 
the forced choice: you’re free to decide, on condition that you make 
the right choice. [...] And is it not the same today with the choice 
‘democracy or fundamentalism’? Is it not that, within the terms of 
this choice, it is simply not possible to choose ’fundamentalism’?” 
(Žižek, 2002: 3). Žižek recognizes that democracy is far more 
problematic here: the democratic principle of no fixed principles 
simply cannot but undermine the logic of fundamentalism being 
the only alternative to democracy.
Autoimmunity and Aporia(s)
What other than such a democracy could withstand all these 
democracies? Derrida writes: “Plato already announces that 
“democracy” is, in the end, neither the name of a regime nor the name 
of a constitution. It is not a constitutional form among others. And 
yet there have in fact been, in addition to the monarchic, plutocratic, 
and tyrannical democracies of antiquity, so many so-called modern 
democratic regimes, regimes that at least present themselves as 
democratic, that is, under and in the name of democracy: democracy 
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at once monarchic (what is called constitutional monarchy) and 
parliamentary (found in a large number of European nation-states), 
popular democracy, direct or indirect democracy, parliamentary 
democracy (whether presidential or not), liberal democracy, 
Christian democracy, social democracy, military and authoritarian 
democracy, and so on” (Derrida, 2005:26–27). What is far more 
problematic here is that, apparently paradoxically, tyrannical, 
military and authoritarian democracy assume a much sincerer 
character. Other democracies which, conversely, hide and suppress 
their sufficitarian democratic deficit and vice versa, tend to be far 
more dictatorial than those whose every secret is perfectly public. 
In addition, the latter explodes in violence all at once, which makes 
us think that the cause is somewhere else, that we are assisting to a 
radical change in regime etc. But the truth is that democracy itself 
is violent. It inscribes us just as de Saussure’s language engraves 
what was previously thought to be its patron: once again – it is us. 
For, what language (even assuming that only one existed) would 
make sense if it did not cruelly exercise its (counter)power on us, 
confounding in such a manner the very raison d’être, origin and 
sense of this relation? With democracy it is the same: the origin is 
continuously and simultaneously here and elsewhere. And so is 
(not) identity.
That is why democracy is autoimmune. As Derrida puts it: “Nothing 
in common, nothing immune, safe and sound, heilig and holy, 
nothing unscathed in the most autonomous living present without 
a risk of autoimmunity. As always, the risk charges itself twice, 
the same finite risk. Two times rather than one: with a menace and 
with a chance. In two words, it must take charge of – one could 
also say: take in trust – the possibility of that radical evil without 
which good would be for nothing” (Derrida, 2002: 82). Of course, 
the first thing that comes to mind when mentioning autoimmunity 
is medicine, clearly. Autoimmune is that which contemporarily 
defends and attacks by attacking the defended and defending the 
attacked. Autoimmunity is aporetic, which does not simply equal to 
imperviousness, a complete breakdown or to a paralysis, but rather 
to that which renders the impossible im-possible, that which fails at 
defining the calm realm(s) of safety and security in that the purpose 
of such realm(s) is always an externality which is both external and 
internal. An internal externality which moves from imperviousness 
without ever simply exceeding it.
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Towards a Conclusion
The initial premise of this brief text was based upon the idea 
that the present-day democracy is under attack and in danger. 
However, two spontaneous questions arose from it: who or what is 
in charge of defending democracy? Is there any subject which could 
announce its crisis and does not this very announcement in form of 
a statement or of an affirmation actually transform into its opposite? 
Does not the very fact that we can doubt that announcement and 
question it amount to an affirmation of the negation by affirmation? 
We questioned it in at least two senses: in the sense of putting it in 
question and in the sense of asking a question to it. If a conclusion 
ideally should offer answers, the hybrid dimension of answers and 
affirmations cannot but put us in an aporetic situation.
Democracy is not the only game in town and it is certainly not a 
house on the hill. Democracy is an oath, a curse, a discourse which 
must be utterly transformed in order to avoid going in the trash 
can of history. The ultimate survival test of democracy will be its 
confrontation with the possibility of status quo. If it stays the very 
same, democracy will disappear in the routine of (non)democratic 
threats to itself.
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